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Since 2005, IASB standards became mandatory for publicly listed European 
companies in the consolidated financial statements (Rule 1606/2002 of European 
Union Commission). The adoption of a uniform accounting standards is expected to 
increase the comparability of the financial information. However, formal harmonization 
does not lead to a convergence in actual financial reporting practice, material 
harmonization, and there are some cultural, political, social and economic factors that 
can influence the preparation and presentation of financial statements. The objective of 
this paper is to investigate the level of harmonization of financial instruments reporting 
practice with IAS 39 (measurement of financial instruments) and to identify if different 
levels of harmonization are associated with firm specific factors. Based on Rahman et 
al. (2002) methodology, we used Jacquard Index in order to determine the level of 
harmonization between IAS 39 and financial reporting practice of a broad based 
sample of number of European listed firms in 2005. Based on these results, we also 
applied regression analysis to identify the firm specific characteristics that affect the 
level of convergence of financial instruments reporting practice. The results of this 
study permits to conclude that formal harmonization does not necessarily lead to 
material harmonization as previous studies have empirically showed. 
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The globalisation of financial markets has given rise to the demand of internationally 
comparable external financial reporting. Harmonisation of accounting standards has 
been seen as an important instrument for achieving more transparent, consistent and 
comparable financial information at an international level. Therefore, the European 
Union (EU) Commission issued, in 2002, the rule 1606/2002 that requires publicly 
listed European companies to adopt International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
standards in the preparation and presentation of consolidated accounts for the periods 
beginning on or after 2005. 
 
However, comparable financial information is unlikely to be achieved only by 
harmonized accounting standards.  
 
First, most political and economic influences on financial reporting practices remain 
local (Ball, 2005). Capital markets are not perfectly integrated and economic and 
political integration are not yet fully complete (Ball, 2005). Therefore, some factors (like 
legal systems, financial systems, role of the accounting profession, tax alignment and 
extent of private versus public ownership of firms) that in the past justified differences 
between accounting systems remain different among European countries.  
 
Second, the enforcement of financial reporting standards is considered to be an 
important factor in the promotion of comparable information (CESR, 2003). Without an 
effective worldwide enforcement mechanism, the local political and economic factors 
will continue to exert substantial influence on local financial reporting practice (Ball, 
2005). 
 
From all the standards issued by IASB, the accounting treatment of financial 
instruments is without any doubt one of the subjects that raise more controversy. At 
first, IASB requires the adoption of fair value for almost all financial instruments. There 
are many potential problems with fair value in practice, especially when liquid markets 
are not available. If liquid markets are not available, firms must estimate the fair value. 
This increases opportunities for manipulation and may introduce some “noise” due to 
imperfect estimation of variables or imperfect or inadequate use of valuation models.   
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Second, the enforcement of International Accounting Standard (IAS) 39 has been one 
of the most difficult processes due to political pressures. IAS 39 was first accepted by 
EU without including two paragraphs.  
 
Third, IAS 39 is one of the most extensive standards and is periodical revised. Since its 
issue, IAS 39 has been revised several times.  
 
Finally, the accounting treatment of financial instruments under IAS 39 is different from 
the accounting treatment under local accounting standards especially for code-law 
countries, like Portugal, France and Italy that use less the fair value valuation. For 
these reasons, it seems that the compliance with IAS 39 may be more difficult than the 
compliance with other standards. 
 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the level of compliance of financial 
instruments reporting practice with IAS 39 (measurement of financial instruments) and 
to identify the determinants of the level of compliance. Our sample consists of 203 
European listed firms that are included in PSI 20, CAC 40, MIB 30, DAX 30 and FTSE 
100, in 2005.  
 
First, we investigate the level of compliance of financial instruments reporting practice 
with IAS 39. Using a self-constructed compliance checklist, we measure the extent of 
publicly listed companies’ compliance with IAS 39, in 2005. Data was collected, 
manually from the first annual reports under International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS)/IAS. Then, based on Rahman et al. (2002) methodology, we 
calculate the Jacquard Index for each firm and for each country, in order to determine 
the level of harmonization between IAS 39 and financial reporting practice, by country. 
We find no significant differences in the level of compliance of financial reporting 
practice between the countries. We find that the Jaccard Indexes are between 0.68 and 
0.93, which seems to suggest that the level of compliance of financial instruments 
reporting practice is not totally achieved by harmonized accounting standards.  
 
Then, we investigate the determinants of the level of compliance. To accomplish this 
second objective, we apply a linear regression model to relate the dependent variable 
(Jacquard Index) with some explanatory variables (country, industry, auditor, size, 
leverage, profitability, listing status and year of IAS/IFRS adoption). We find that 
industry and year of adoption are the only explanatory variable whose estimated 
coefficient is statistically significant with a 5% significance level. This seems to suggest 
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that the level of compliance with IAS 39 is greater for financial institutions, as predicted. 
However, contrary to our predictions, we also find that the estimated coefficient of year 
of adoption is negative and statistically significant for 1% significance level which 
seems to suggest that first-time adopters tend to comply more with IAS 39 than firms 
that adopt IAS 39 in a previous period. 
 
Our findings make three contributions to prior literature. First, we investigate the extent 
of IAS 39 compliance in jurisdictions where the adoption of IFRS/IAS is mandatory. 
Most previous IAS compliance studies use samples of firms that adopt voluntarily 
IAS/IFRS (Street et al., 1999; Tower et al., 1999; Street and Bryant, 2000; Street and 
Gray, 2001 and Glaum and Street, 2003). Second, we investigate the compliance with 
IFRS/IAS in the first period that firms must adopt those standards. As IFRS 1 states 
(IFRS 1, §1), it is important to assure that the first financial statements prepared and 
presented under IFRS contain high quality information that is transparent for users and 
comparable over all periods presented and provides a suitable starting point for 
accounting under IFRS. Finally, we investigate the compliance with IAS 39, one of the 
most controversial and complex standards. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the main accounting 
policies for financial instrument under IAS 39 and reviews relevant literature. Section 3 
provides a description of the hypotheses, variables and sample. Section 4 present 




2.1. Main accounting policies for financial instrum ents (IAS 39) 
 
The objective of IAS 39 is to establish principles for recognising and measuring 
financial assets, financial liabilities and some contracts to buy or sell non-financial 
items. Requirements for presenting information about financial instruments and for 
disclosing information about financial instruments is in IAS 32 Financial Instruments: 
Presentation and in IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures, respectively. 
 
IAS 39 requires that a firm measures financial assets and financial liabilities recognised 
initially at its fair value plus, in the case of a financial asset or financial liability not at fair 
value through profit or loss, transaction costs that are directly attributable to the 
acquisition or issue of the financial asset or financial liability.  
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For the purpose of measuring a financial asset after initial recognition, IAS 39 classifies 
financial assets into four categories: financial assets at fair value through profit or loss; 
held-to-maturity investments; loans and receivables; and available-for-sale financial 
assets.  
 
Table 1 summarizes the initial and subsequent measurement of the four categories of 
financial assets. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
For the purpose of measuring a financial liability after initial recognition, IAS 39 
classifies financial liabilities into two categories: financial liabilities at fair value through 
profit or loss and other financial liabilities.  
 
Table 2 summarizes the initial and subsequent measurement of the two categories of 
financial liabilities. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
IAS 39 also identifies the accounting treatment of derivatives. Figure 1 summarizes the 
initial and subsequent measurement of the derivatives classified as hedge instruments 
and classified as at fair value through profit and loss. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
2.2 Previous studies 
 
Our study is related to two main streams of investigation. First, our study is closely 
related to those studies that investigate compliance with IAS/IFRS. Second, our study 
is also related to those studies that investigate the level of disclosure of information 
about financial instruments.  
 
Studies about the compliance with IAS/IFRS 
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Several studies investigate the level of compliance of firms’ accounting practices with 
IAS/IFRS. 
 
Street and Bryant (2000) investigate firms that make reference to the use of IASs, in 
2000, and find that the overall level of disclosure is greater for firms with US listings. 
They also find that a higher level of disclosure is associated with an audit opinion that 
states the financial statements are in accordance with IASs and that International 
Standards of Auditing were followed when conducting the audit. 
 
Street and Gray (2001) examine the financial statements and footnotes of a worldwide 
sample of firms referring to the use of IASs, to explore the extent of noncompliance, 
and to provide information about the factors associated with noncompliance. They find 
that there is a significant extent of noncompliance with IAS and that key factors 
associated with levels of compliance include listing status, being audited by a Big 5+2 
firm, the manner of reference to IAS, and country of domicile. As regards compliance 
with IAS measurement and presentation standards, they find that compliance tends to 
be higher for firms that make exclusive reference to the use of IAS, are audited by a 
Big 5+2 firm, and that are domiciled in China. At the same time, compliance tends to be 
lower for firms domiciled in France or Africa. 
 
Street et al. (1999) investigate the extent of compliance with the IASs, in terms of 
accounting policies and disclosures, in 1996. They find that the degree of compliance 
by firms is very mixed and selective and identify the most important areas of non-
compliance. Since the study is based on 1996’s information, it does not cover financial 
instruments’ standards. 
 
Al-Shammari et al. (2006) also investigate the extent of compliance with IASs by firms 
in the Gulf Co-Operation Council member states. They find that the level of compliance 
is lower than that observed in developed countries and that compliance varies across 
firms according to a number of attributes, such as industry, size, leverage and 
internationality.  
 
Studies about the level of disclosure of financial instruments’ information 
 
Woods and Marginson (2004) evaluate the usefulness of disclosures under FRS 13 
from a user's perspective based on the 1999 annual reports of UK banks. Their 
findings suggest that the narrative disclosures are generic in nature, the numerical data 
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incomplete and not always comparable, and that it is difficult for the user to combine 
both narrative and numerical information in order to assess the banks' risk profile.  
 
Dunne et al. (2003) also investigate changes in the level of disclosure on derivatives 
and other financial instruments that followed the introduction of FRS 13. They find that 
the implementation of FRS 13 was associated with a large increase in derivatives 
related information available in annual reports. 
 
Finally, Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) investigate managers’ responses to derivative 
financial instruments disclosure requirements proposed by the Australian Accounting 
standards setting bodies and the Australian Society of Corporate Treasures (ASCT). 
They find that the legitimacy and institutional theories provide plausible explanations as 
to what impulse prompted managers’ responses. 
  
 




IASB standards are developed in environments where accounting practices are 
especially directed to private sector, reporting rules are largely unaffected by taxation 
requirements and capital is traditionally raised in public markets. IASB standards are 
clearly influenced by common-law countries, like United States of America (USA) and 
the United Kingdom (UK). However, Portuguese, Spanish, French, Italian and 
Germany institutional and legal environments are different and these differences affect 
the accounting systems.  
 
We expect that the level of compliance with IAS 39 will be higher for firms from 
common-law countries than for firms from code-law countries for two main reasons. 
First, IASB standards are more similar to accounting standards from common-law 
countries than from code-law countries. Therefore, it is easier for firms from common-
law countries to comply with IASB standards. Second, LaPorta et al. (1998) show that 
the index of private and public enforcement is higher for UK than for other European 
countries. Additionally, LaPorta et al. (1998) also that the creditor rights and 
shareholders rights tend to be higher in UK than in other European countries. 
 
This leads to our first hypothesis: 
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H1: Since common-law countries have more strong enforcement mechanisms, we 
expect that the level of compliance with IAS 39 will be higher for firms from common-
law countries than for firms from code-law countries.  
 
To capture the country effect, we use a binary variable that assumes the value 1 if the 
firm is from a common-law country and 0 otherwise (hereafter COUNTRY).  
 
Financial institutions are more regulated entities than firms from other sectors. 
Therefore, financial institutions have more incentives to comply with IASB standards 
than non-financial firms. Additionally, it is expectable that entities in a given industry 
may comply more closely with a particular IAS that is more applicable to their activities. 
Consequently, financial institutions tend to comply more with IAS 39, since their activity 
is closely related to financial instruments. 
  
This leads to our second hypothesis: 
 
H2: Since financial institutions are more regulated, we expect that the level of 
compliance with IAS 39 is more likely to be higher in financial institutions than in the 
other sectors. 
 
To capture the industry effect, we use a binary variable that assumes the value 1 if the 
firm is a financial institution and 0 otherwise (hereafter INDUSTRY).  
 
Prior research provides some evidence that the level of compliance may be associated 
with the type of auditor. Auditing is considered to be an important enforcement 
mechanism. There is evidence that earnings of US firms with Big 4 are of higher quality 
and that the stock market values earnings surprises of Big 4 clients more highly than 
earnings surprises of firms with non-Big 4 auditors (Teoh and Wong, 1993; Krishnan, 
2003). Additionally, Francis and Wang (2006) find that earnings quality increases for 
firms with Big 4 auditors, based on an international broad based sample. In fact, non-
Big 4 auditors do not have the same incentives to enforce greater accounting 
information quality: non-Big 4 auditors have less to loose in accommodating clients and 
signing off on accounting information that is of lower quality. 
 
We expect that firms that are audited by one of the Big 4 will have a higher level of 
compliance with IAS 39.  
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This leads to our third hypothesis: 
 
H3: Since auditing is an important enforcement mechanism, we expect that the level of 
compliance with IAS 39 is more likely to be higher for firms audited by one of the BIG 4. 
 
To capture the auditor, we use a binary variable that assumes the value 1 if the firm is 
audited by one of the BIG 4 and 0 otherwise (hereafter AUDITOR).  
 
Larger firms are more likely to comply with IASB standards for three main reasons. 
First, larger firms are more visible and tend to act to protect their reputation. Second, 
larger firms tend to have more resources to comply with new accounting standards. 
Finally, larger firms tend to be less affected by the adjustments than smaller firms. 
 
This leads to our fourth hypothesis: 
 
H4: Since larger firms are more visible, have more resources and tend to be less 
affected by the adoption of a new accounting model, we expect that the level of 
compliance with IAS 39 is more likely to be higher in larger firms. 
 
To capture firms’ size, we use the market value of equity (hereafter MVE). We obtain 
the information from Worldscope Database and the amounts are expressed in 
thousands of Euros.  
 
We also expect that firms that are listed in more than one market tend to have a higher 
level of compliance. Street and Bryant (2000), Street and Gray (2001) and Glaum and 
Street (2003) have shown that firms which are cross listed have higher levels of 
compliance.  
 
This leads to our fifth hypothesis: 
 
H5: We expect that the level of compliance with IAS 39 is more likely to be higher in 
firms listed in more than one market. 
 
To capture the listing status, we use a binary variable that assumes the value 1 if the 
firm is listed in more than one market and 0 otherwise (hereafter INT). 
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Firms with higher leverage are expected to disclose more information in order to 
reduce agency costs. A greater level of disclosure can be expected to lead to more 
compliance with IASB standards. 
 
This leads to our sixth hypothesis: 
 
H6: Since higher leveraged firms are expected to disclose more information, we expect 
that the level of compliance with IAS 39 is more likely to be higher in firms with higher 
leverage. 
 
To capture leverage, we use the ratio Total debt/Total assets (hereafter TDTA). We 
obtain the information from Worldscope Database and the amounts are expressed in 
thousands of Euros.  
 
Prior research regarding the association between profitability and level of compliance 
found mixed results. Wallace et al. (1994) and Wallace and Naser (1995) research 
indicates a significant association. However, Al-Shammari et al. (2006) find that 
profitability is not a statistically significant variable. Due to the mixed findings from prior 
studies, we do not predict a sign for the estimated coefficient of profitability. 
 
To capture profitability, we use the ratio net income (hereafter NI). We obtain the 
information from Worldscope Database and the amounts are expressed in thousands 
of Euros. 
 
Finally, we expect that the number of years of IASB standards adoption is an important 
variable to explain the level of compliance. We expect that the knowledge and the 
correct adoption of IAS 39 increase with time.  
 
This leads to our final hypothesis: 
 
H7: We expect that the level of compliance with IAS 39 is more likely to be higher in 
firms that adopt IAS 39 before 2005 than for first time adopters. 
 
To capture the number of years of IAS 39 adoption, we use a binary variable that 






Our sample consists of 203 Europeans listed firms that are included in PSI 20, CAC 40, 
MIB 40, DAX 30 and FTSE 100 in 2005  (Table 3). In this exploratory study, we 
exclude from our sample the firms that only present their financial reports based on 
USGAAP or UKGAAP, therefore firms that do not apply IASs.  
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 3, Panel A, shows descriptive statistics for our sample firms in terms of country 
representation. Most of the firms are from United Kingdom. Table 3, Panel B, shows 
representation by industry. The sample comprises a range of industries, with most 





The first objective of this study is to investigate the level of compliance of financial 
instruments reporting practice with IAS 39 (measurement of financial instruments). To 
accomplish this goal, we use a self-constructed compliance checklist in order to 
measure the extent of publicly listed firms’ compliance with IAS 39, in 2005 (Appendix 
A). Data was collected, manually from the first annual reports under IFRS/IAS. Then, 
based on Rahman et al. (2002) methodology, we calculate the Jaccard Index for each 
firm in order to determine the level of harmonization between IAS 39 and financial 
reporting practice. 
 
The option for similar measures is justified by Everitt and Rabe-Hesketh (1997, p. 15) 
and Krzanowski and Marriot (1995, p. 69). These authors suggest that in the cases 
where the variables in study are of binary type, the measures of similarity are 
traditionally used, rather than the measures of dissimilarity. 
 
The information for accounting treatment was collected on a dichotomous classification 
“1” and “0”. We assigned the value “1” when a firm used the accounting procedure and 
a “0” when a firm did not use the accounting procedure. In certain circumstances, we 
identified that a firm was not using an accounting procedure because the company was 
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not required to. In these situations, we assigned a blank and such cases were excluded 
from our analyses. Finally, when the firm did not disclose an accounting procedure but 
the firm was required to do it, a “0” was assigned.  
 
Therefore, from de exhaustive application of procedures, we obtained a set of binary 
data to which applied measures of similarity for the analysis of compliance of financial 
instruments reporting practice with IAS 39. 
 
The calculation of the above coefficients will be made by a 2*2 table, as follows: 
 
  Firm  
  1 0 Total 
1 a b a+b IAS 39 
0 c d c+d 
 Total a+c b+d a+b+c+d 
 
Where: 
a = Number of matches when the firm adopted the procedure required by IAS 
39, (1,1); 
b = Number of mismatches, (1,0); 
c = Number of mismatches, (0,1); 
d = Number of matches when both the, firm did not adopt the procedure and 
the procedure is not required by IAS, (0,0). 
 
Two types of Jaccard coefficients were calculated. The first coefficient measures the 
extent of likeness between the practices that were adopted by the firm and the IAS 39, 
named JACC1. The second coefficient measures the degree of likeness for accounting 
treatment that were not adopted in the two cases, the firm and the IAS 39, that we 
denominated JACC2. 
 
The expressions used for the coefficients, for each pair, are translated by the following 
expression: 
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=2                                 (2) 
 
The values of the indexes may vary between 0 and 1. The lower the value of the index 
the lower the degree of harmonisation between the procedures required by IAS 39 and 
the practices adopted by the firms, for the theme in question. On the contrary, the 
higher they are, the higher the degrees of harmonisation. 
 
After estimating the coefficients by firm, we compute the average of Jaccard indexes by 
country and we also compute the average of Jaccard indexes for all the firms from the 
5 countries included in our sample. 
 
The second objective of this paper is to investigate the determinants of the level of 









        
(1) 
where 1JACC  is the coefficient that measures the extent of likeness between the 
practices that were adopted by the firm i and the IAS 39; iCOUNTRY  assumes the 
value 1 if the firm i is from a common-law country and 0 otherwise; iINDUSTRY  
assumes the value if the firm i is a financial institution and 0 otherwise; iAUDITOR  
assumes the value 1 if the firm i is audited by one of the BIG 4 and 0 otherwise; iMVE  
is the market value of equity of firm i; iINT  assumes the value 1 if the firm i is listed in  
more than one market and 0 otherwise; iTDTA  is the ratio total debt/total assets for 
firm i; iNI  is net income for firm i; and iPASTADOPT   assumes the value 1 if the firm 





In this section, we describe the main results of our investigation. The results must be 
interpreted within the characteristics of this work and must take into account the 
limitations that derive from the methodology adopted and/or data used.  
 
The first objective of this study is to investigate the level of compliance of financial 
instruments reporting practice with IAS 39 (measurement of financial instruments). So, 
we start with the interpretation of the Jaccard coefficient, for all pairs in each country, 
for similarity in practices adopted (JACC1). Smaller values of Jaccard coefficient 
suggest a lower level of harmonisation between financial instruments reporting 
practices and IAS 39. On the contrary, higher values of Jaccard coefficient suggest 
higher degrees of harmonisation.  
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
As we can see from Table 4, and as we expected, United Kingdom presents the 
highest index and Germany the lowest. These results show that Germany firms tend to 
adopt less the accounting procedures required by IAS 39 than the other European 
listed firms. However, we can not forget that Germany firms represent only 10% of the 
firms included in our sample and UK firms 47%. The value of Jaccard coefficient is very 
similar between Portuguese and French firms although the number of firms included in 
the sample is different: 40 French firms and only 20 Portuguese firms. 
 
A deeper analysis allows us to conclude that the diversity between financial 
instruments accounting practices and IAS 39 is due to the procedures adopted in initial 
measurement of financial instruments. We find that firms tend not to comply with the 
accounting procedure required, in IAS 39, in initial measurement, for the transaction 
costs of held to maturity investments, loans and receivables and available-for-sale 
financial assets.  
 
We also find that, in general, firms comply with the accounting procedures required for 
subsequent measurement of all the financial assets and liabilities categories. In 
particular, we find a total harmonization in the case of derivatives, for which all the firms 
of the sample adopt the accounting treatment required by the IAS 39. 
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We have also computed separately the index with financial firms and without this type 
of industry, and we can conclude that in this industry the level of compliance is highest 
than the other industries.  
 
If we analyse the results by country we can observe that in UK we find 10 (11%) firms 
with a JACC1 lower than 0.6. On the other hand, in the others countries we find only 
one or two firms with an index lower than 0.6. In addition, for the cases with an index 
equal to 1, which means total harmonization, we have 8 (8%) UK firms, 8 (20%) French 
firms, 6 (21%) Italian firms and 4 (20%) Portuguese firms. In the case of Germany 
firms, any indexes equal to 1 have found and we have found 6 companies with JACC 
lower than 0.6 (15%). These findings result from the fact that Germany firms do not 
disclose information about the initial measurement of financial instruments. 
 
When we analyse the results from the Jaccard coefficient, for all pairs in each country, 
for accounting procedures not adopted in the two cases (JACC2), we conclude that the 
level of harmonization is higher than the JACC1 for all countries. This means that in the 
case of the procedures not required by the IAS 39 the level of harmonization between 
accounting practices and the accounting standard is higher than in the cases of the 
treatment adopted. In this case we can notice that, in general, the companies do not 
adopt forbidden treatments. Nevertheless, we have to be careful in the analysis of 
these results because it is very difficult to understand, from the annual reports, why a 
certain procedure is not adopted. 
 
Our second objective of this paper is to investigate the determinants of the level of 
compliance. To accomplish this second objective, we estimate the linear regression. 
The results are shown in table 5. 
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
As one can see, the estimated model is statistically significant and the explanatory 
power evaluated by the Adjusted R-squared is around 6%.  
 
We find that INDUSTRY and PASTADOPT are the only explanatory variable whose 
estimated coefficient is statistically significant with a 5% significance level. This seems 
to suggest that the level of compliance with IAS 39 is greater for financial institutions, 
as predicted. However, we also find that the estimated coefficient of PASTADOPT is 
 16 
negative and statistically significant for 1% significance level which seems to suggest 
that first-time adopters tend to comply more with IAS 39 than firms that adopt IAS 39 in 
a previous period. This finding may be justified for two reasons: first when we 
estimated the index, we attribute the value 0 to firms that did not disclose information 
about financial instruments. This may not mean that the firm did not comply with IAS 39 
measurement policies but only that the firm did not disclose the information required. 
Second, IAS 39 is one of the standards that suffer more revisions, which may reduce 




Our exploratory study provides empirical evidence of the level of harmonization 
between accounting standards and accounting practices in what concern IAS 39.  
 
Based on a sample of 203 European listed companies, we investigate the level of 
compliance of financial instruments reporting practice with IAS 39 (measurement of 
financial instruments). 
 
We find that the Jaccard Indexes are between 0.68 and 0.93, which seems to suggest 
that the level of compliance of financial instruments reporting practice is not totally 
achieved by harmonized accounting standards. We also find that industry and the year 
of IAS/IFRS adoption are the only explanatory variable whose estimated coefficient is 
statistically significant with a 5% significance level. This seems to suggest that firms 
that the level of compliance with IAS 39 is greater for financial institutions, as predicted. 
However, we also find that the estimated coefficient of year of IAS/IFRS adoption is 
negative and statistically significant for 1% significance level which seems to suggest 
that first-time adopters tend to comply more with IAS 39 than firms that adopt IAS 39 in 
a previous period. 
 
Our findings make three contributions to prior literature. First, we investigate the extent 
of IAS 39 compliance in jurisdictions where the adoption of IFRS/IAS is mandatory. 
Most previous IAS compliance studies use samples of firms that adopt voluntarily. 
Second, we investigate the compliance with IFRS/IAS in the first period that firms must 
adopt those standards. Finally, we investigate the compliance with IAS 39, one of the 
most controversial and complex standard. 
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We intend to improve this investigatio in two additional ways. First, we will include other 
European countries. Second, we will extend the checklist to include also disclosure 
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Appendix A – Compliance checklist 
 
Items IAS 39 Companies 
1. Financial assets at fair value through profit and loss   
1.1 Initial measurement    
      1.1.1. Fair value plus transaction costs  0 (1 or 0) 
      1.1.2. Fair value 1 (1 or 0) 
1.2. Subsequent measurement   
      1.2.1. Cost  0 (1 or 0) 
      1.2.2. Amortized cost 0 (1 or 0) 
      1.2.3. Fair value in profit and loss 1 (1 or 0) 
      1.2.4. Fair value in equity 0 (1 or 0) 
      1.2.5. Impairment 0 (1 or 0) 
2. Held to maturity investments   
2.1. Initial measurement    
      2.1.1. Fair value plus transaction costs  1 (1 or 0) 
      2.1.2. Fair value 0 (1 or 0) 
2.2. Subsequent measurement   
     2.2.1. Cost  0 (1 or 0) 
      2.2.2. Amortized cost 1 (1 or 0) 
     2.2.3. Fair value in profit and loss 0 (1 or 0) 
     2.2.4. Fair value in equity 0 (1 or 0) 
     2.2.5. Impairment 1 (1 or 0) 
3. Loans and receivables   
3.1. Initial measurement    
     3.1.1. Fair value plus transaction costs  1 (1 or 0) 
     3.1.2. Fair value 0 (1 or 0) 
3.2. Subsequent measurement   
     3.2.1. Cost  0 (1 or 0) 
      3.2.2. Amortized cost 1 (1 or 0) 
      3.2.3. Fair value in profit and loss 0 (1 or 0) 
     3.2.4. Fair value in equity 0 (1 or 0) 
     3.2.5. Impairment 1 (1 or 0) 
4. Available-for-sale financial assets   
4.1. Initial measurement    
      4.1.1. Fair value plus transaction costs 1 (1 or 0) 
      4.1.2. Fair value 0 (1 or 0) 
4.2. Subsequent measurement   
     4.2.1. Cost  1 (1 or 0) 
      4.2.2. Amortized cost 0 (1 or 0) 
      4.2.3. Fair value in profit and loss 0 (1 or 0) 
      4.2.4. Fair value in equity 1 (1 or 0) 
      4.2.5. Impairment 1 (1 or 0) 
5. Financial liabilities at fair value through profit and loss   
5.1. Initial measurement    
      5.1.1. Fair value plus transaction costs 0 (1 or 0) 
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      5.1.2. Fair value 1 (1 or 0) 
5.2. Subsequent measurement   
     5.2.1. Cost  0 (1 or 0) 
     5.2.2. Amortized cost 0 (1 or 0) 
      5.2.3. Fair value in profit and loss 1 (1 or 0) 
     5.2.4. Fair value in equity 0 (1 or 0) 
      5.2.5. Impairment 0 (1 or 0) 
6. Other financial liabilities   
6.1. Initial measurement    
     6.1.1. Fair value plus transaction costs  1 (1 or 0) 
     6.1.2. Fair value 0 (1 or 0) 
6.2. Subsequent measurement   
     6.2.1. Cost  0 (1 or 0) 
     6.2.2. Amortized cost 1 (1 or 0) 
     6.2.3. Fair value in profit and loss 0 (1 or 0) 
     6.2.4. Fair value in equity 0 (1 or 0) 
     6.2.5. Impairment 0 (1 or 0) 
 7. Derivatives   
 7.1. Fair value hedge   
      7.1.1. Profit and loss 1 (1 or 0) 
      7.1.2. Equity 0 (1 or 0) 
      7.1.3. Defferal 0 (1 or 0) 
 7.2. Cash flow hedge   
     7.2.1. Profit and loss 0 (1 or 0) 
      7.2.2. Equity 1 (1 or 0) 
      7.2.3. Defferal 0 (1 or 0) 
 7.3. Hedge of a net investment in a foreign operation   
      7.3.1. Profit and loss 0 (1 or 0) 
      7.3.2. Equity 1 (1 or 0) 
      7.3.3. Defferal 0 (1 or 0) 
 7.4. Financial assets or liabilities at fair value through profit and 
loss 
  
      7.4.1. Profit and loss 1 (1 or 0) 
      7.4.2. Equity 0 (1 or 0) 
      7.4.3. Defferal 0 (1 or 0) 
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Appendix B –Variables, variables definitions and es timated sign 
 
1) Dependent variables 
JACC1 Jaccard coefficient Measures the extent of likeness between 
the practices that were adopted by the firm  
and the IAS 39 
 
 
2) Independent variables 
Variable Description Estimated sign 
COUNTRY Assumes the value 1 if the firm is 
from UK and 0 otherwise. 
+ 
INDUSTRY Assumes the value if firm is a 
financial institution and 0 otherwise. 
+ 
AUDITOR Assumes the value 1 if firm is 
audited by one of the BIG 4 and 0 
otherwise. 
+ 
MVE Market value of equity. + 
INT Assumes the value 1 if the firm is 
listed in more than one market and 
0 otherwise. 
+ 
TDTA Ratio total debt/total assets for firm. ? 
NI Net income. + 
PASTADOPT Assumes the value 1 if the firm 
adopted IASB standards before 
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Hedge of a net 




losses of the 
hedge 
derivative and 
of the hedge 
item 
recognised in 
profit or loss. 
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Gains and losses 






Gains and losses 
of the derivative 
recognised in 














at fair value 
through profit or 
loss 
Fair value. Fair value, with 
gains and losses 
recognised in profit 
or loss. 




Fair value plus 
transaction 
costs. 
Amortised cost using 
the effective interest 
method. 
Impairment loss recognised, if 
there is any objective evidence 
that a financial asset or group 
of financial assets is impaired. 
Loans and 
receivables 
Fair value plus 
transaction 
costs. 
Amortised cost using 
the effective interest 
method. 
Impairment loss recognised, if 
there is any objective evidence 
that a financial asset or group 




Fair value plus 
transaction 
costs. 
Fair value, with 
gains and losses 
recognised in equity. 
Impairment loss recognised, if 
there is any objective evidence 
that a financial asset or group 














liabilities at fair 
value through 
profit or loss 
Fair value. Fair value, with 
gains or losses 
recognised in profit 
or loss. 




Fair value less 
transaction 
costs. 
Amortised cost using 
the effective interest 
method. 




 Table 3  
 Firms included in the sample 
 
 























 40 30 100 30 20 
 
USGAAP 
 - (2) (5) (8) - 
Other  - (1)  (1) - 
Total  40 27 95 21 20 
 
 
































Aerospace 2 1,0 0 0 0 0 2 
Apparel 1 0,5 0 1 0 0 0 
Automotive 5 2,5 2 2 1 0 0 
Beverages and food 10 4,9 2 0 1 0 7 
Chemicals 7 3,4 2 2 0 0 3 
Construction 12 5,9 3 0 1 5 3 
Drugs, cosm. and health 7 3,4 2 1 0 0 4 
Electrical 3 1,5 3 0 0 0 0 
Electronics 4 2,0 2 0 0 0 2 
Financial 50 24,7 6 4 15 3 22 
Machinery equipment 2 1,0 0 2 0 0 0 
Metal producers and 
man. 
10 4,9 2 0 0 0 8 
Oil, gas and coal 8 3,9 1 0 1 1 5 
Paper, print and 
publishing 
7 3,4 1 0 0 3 3 
Recreation 7 3,4 1 0 1 0 5 
Retailers 12 5,9 2 1 0 2 7 
Textiles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tobacco 3 1,5 0 0 0 0 3 
Transportation 4 2,0 0 2 0 0 2 
Utilities 26 12,8 4 2 5 4 11 
Services 9 4,5 1 2 1 0 5 
Others 14 6,9 6 2 1 2 3 













Germany 0,680 0,819 
France 0,839 0,904 
Portugal 0,856 0,909 
Italy 0,871 0,923 





  Coefficient  t-statistic 
C  -0.190  -3.613*** 
COUNTRY  -0.031  -1.125 
INDUSTRY  0.074  2.357** 
AUDITOR  -0.057  -1.141 
MVE  0.000  0.847 
INT  -0.005  -0.176 
TDTA  0.001  1.487 
NI  0.000  -0.656 
PASTADOPT  -0.119  -2.751*** 
     
     
N  203   
Adjusted R2  0.056   
F statistic   2.478 (0.014)   
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
Sample includes 203 European firms listed in PSI20, CAC40, DAX30, FTSE100 and MIB30. COUNTRY assumes the 
value 1 if the firms i is from UK and 0 otherwise; INDUSTRY assumes the value if firm i is a financial institution and 0 
otherwise; AUDITOR assumes the value 1 if firm i is audited by one of the BIG 4 and 0 otherwise; MVE is the market 
value of equity of firm i; INT assumes the value 1 if the firm i is listed in  more than one market and 0 otherwise; TDTA is 
the ratio total debt/total assets for firm i; NI is net income for firm i; and PASTADOPT  assumes the value 1 if the firm 
adopted IASB standards before 2005 and 0 otherwise. 
 
